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RECENT DECISIONS

hance the usefulness and the validity of a bank draft. The drafts are
more readily acceptable and the instrument is realistically equated
to cash.

M
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CoMMERCE CLAUSE-RAILROAD HE=

LIABLE FOR SAFETY APPLIANCE ACTS VIOLATIONs.-Defendant rail-

road prevailed at trial and primary appellate levels in a suit for
statutory penalties under the Safety Appliance Acts. The violations
alleged were based on movements of rolling stock by yard crews and
engines without operable air-brakes save those on the engines. The
acts, by permissive regulation of the ICC, require that all cars involved in interstate commerce be equipped with power-brakes and
that eighty-five per cent of the cars in any train have them in operating condition. The journeys in question, while only covering two
miles, were intersected by roads and railroad tracks. The Supreme
Court, in reversing the Court of Appeals, held that such movements
constituted train movements within the purview of the acts and were
therefore subject to the brake regulations. United States v. Seaboard
Air Line R.R., 361 U.S. 78 (1959).
The Safety Appliance Acts,' the first of which was promulgated
in 1893, had as their ultimate object the increased protection of railroad passengers and employees.2 Their immediate objective related
to the compulsory use of certain safety devices, commencing with
the equipping of all rolling stock with power brakes and automatic
couplers, 3 and secondly, the use of air-brakes operable from the engine 4 in varying quantities. 5 The purpose was to discourage use of
hand brakes and pin-bar couplings through imposition of a $100 fine
127

Stat. 531 (1893), 32 Stat. 943 (1903), 36 Stat. 298 (1910), as

amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1958).
of ICC
regulations.
2

Preamble, 27 Stat. 531 (1893).

Modifications have been made by means
See, e.g., Delk v. St. Louis & S.F.R.R.,

220 U.S. 580, 582 (1911) ; Andersen v. Bingham & G. Ry., 169 F.2d 328, 330
(10th Cir. 1948); United States v. New York Cent. & H.R.R., 205 Fed. 428,
429 (W.D.N.Y. 1913); United States v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 149 Fed.
486, 488 (S.D. Iowa 1906).
3 See Delk v. St. Louis & S.F.R.R., supra note 2.
427 Stat. 531 (1893), 45 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
But see Richmond, F. &
P.R.R. v. Brooks, 197 F.2d 404, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (split control of brakes
between engineer and conductor, apparently a departure from the act, is
allowed because it fulfills the original legislative intent).
527 Stat. 532 (1893), 45 U.S.C. § 1 (1958) (called for sufficient air-brakes
to be installed so as to preclude use of the common hand brake) ; 32 Stat. 943
(1903), 45 U.S.C. § 9 (1958) (wherein the percentage was set at 507o and the
ICC was empowered to alter the rate following suitable hearings and deliberations) ; 11 ICC Rep. 429 (1905) (the percentage was raised to 75%) ; 49 CFR
132.1 (1958) (raised in 1910 to 85%, the present ratio).
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per violation. 6 The remedial and humanitarian nature of the acts led
to a liberal construction of their protection, 7 e.g., to include vehicles
and persons at grade crossings," and men unloading freight cars.9
The present issue, viz., does the movement of cars in the manner
indicated constitute a switching action or a train movement, has many
times been before the courts.' 0 There is apparently no solution either
extant or in the offing principally as a result of two factors: first,
there are no clear and authoritative definitions indicated in the acts,"
and neither Congress nor the ICC has undertaken to compose any;
second, the judiciary's approach to the question places stress on the
particular facts of the situation,
thereby endorsing and effecting a
12
policy of broad discretion.
Despite inescapable variations in construction, some points were
established against which no argument was raised. Thus, it was
accepted that the brake provisions 13applied only to "train movements,"
"switching actions" being exempt.
It was also settled that the general test to be applied in deciding between a "train" and a "switching"
action would be "the essential nature of the work done rather than
in the names applied to those engaged in it." 14 Also in line with the
policy of judicial discretion, the pronouncements of courts placed the
"train versus switching action" dispute in the realm of law, deter-

6 The penalty was changed to $250 after the instant action was commenced.
71 Stat. 352 (1957), 45 U.S.C. § 6 (1958).
7 See, e.g., United States v. Houston Belt & Terminal Ry., 210 F.2d 421,
425 (5th Cir. 1954); Southern Pac. Co. v. Carson, 169 F.2d 734, 736-37 (9th
Cir. 1948); United States v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 43 F.2d 300, 302
(8th Cir. 1930); Bocook v. Louisville & N.R.R., 67 F. Supp. 154, 159 (E.D.
Ky. 1946).
s See Andersen v. Bingham & G. Ry., 169 F.2d 328, 330 (10th Cir. 1948).
9 Rush v. Thompson, 356 Mo. 568, 202 S.W.2d 800, 806 (1947).
10 See, e.g., Chicago & E.R.R. v. United States, 22 F.2d 729 (7th Cir.
1927) ; Illinois Cent. R.R. v. United States, 14 F.2d 747, 748 (8th Cir. 1926).
11 See United States v. Panhandle & S.F. Ry., 203 F.2d 241, 246 (5th Cir.
1953); United States v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 199 F.2d 223, 226 (7th Cir.
1952).
12 See United States v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., supra note 11.
The court
indicates dissatisfaction with the continuance of the problem, as well as its
remaining in the hands of the judiciary.
13 United States v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., supra note 11, at 224; Philadelphia & R. Ry. v. Bartsch, 9 F.2d 858, 860 (3d Cir. 1925).
14 United States v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 237 U.S. 410, 413 (1915) ; accord,
United States v. Texas & N.O.RR., 13 F.2d 429, 431 (S.D. Tex. 1926). This
principle meant purpose, not appearance, but also came to mean inherent character of the activity, i.e., hazardous to life, therefore within the legislative
intent of the acts. See United States v. South Buffalo R.R., 168 F.2d 948
(2d Cir. 1948). As a corollary, the motive vehicle was not restricted to
regular locomotives, but applied to any device moving a string of cars. See
Spokane & Inland Empire R.R. v. Campbell, 241 U.S. 497, 507 (1916) (electric engine); Hoffman v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 74 F.2d 227, 232 (2d
Cir. 1934) (gasoline engine); United States v. Great No. Ry., 73 F.2d 736,
739 (9th Cir. 1934) (switching engine) ; United States v. Fort Worth & D.C.
Ry., 21 F. Supp. 916, 918 (N.D. Tex. 1937) (locomotive crane).
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minable by a court, not a jury. 5 These are generically "rules," but
actually they lead back to the original query what is a "train"; what
is a "switching" action.
Within the two areas, however, certain fundamentals have been
evolved. The unrefined norm for deducing the presence of a "train"
suggested that it "consists of an engine and cars which have been
assembled and coupled together for a run or trip along the road." 16
Conversely, it was reckoned that "various movements in railroad
yards whereby cars are assembled and coupled into outgoing trains
and whereby incoming trains which have completed their run are
broken up," 17 or, "sorting, or selecting, or classifying of [cars],
involving coupling and uncoupling, and the movement of one or a
few at a time for short distances," Is evidenced a switching action. 9
Other factors which are given weight include distance and size of
convoy, normal rate of speed and traffic on the track used, and
hazards afforded other trains, persons and vehicles at grade crossings.2 0 Judicial application of these diverse terms to individual litigations has provided widely divergent results, even between cases
amazingly similar in fact. 2
The trouble lies not in the recognition
of rules, for they are plentiful, but in their application within each
of the two areas.
In United States v. Erie R.R., 22 "movements in railroad yards
whereby cars are assembled and coupled" defined the activity of the
"switching action." Negative attempts at definition have cautioned
that the distance travelled and the number of cars moved are not to
24
be controlling; 23 nor is the fact that a mainline has been used.
Illustrative of "switching actions," are instances where forty-seven
to eighty-seven cars were moved within a single yard over two miles
without stopping, encountering two private roads but no tracks, with

Is United States v. Thompson, 252 F.2d 6, 9 (8th Cir. 1958).
16 United States v. Erie R.R., 237 U.S. 402, 407 (1915).

1 Id. at 408.
18 Louisville & J. Bridge Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 534, 538 (1919).
19 Louisville & J. Bridge Co. v. United States, supra note 18; see United
States
20 v. Erie R.R., supra note 16.
United States v. Panhandle & S.F. Ry., 203 F.2d 241, 246 (5th Cir. 1953);
United States v. South Buffalo R.R., 168 F.2d 948, 952 (2d Cir. 1948) (hazard
to plant workers at entrance gate); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. United States, 14
F.2d 747, 749 (8th Cir. 1926). Noting that most cases mention the presence
of main track, this is but an evidentiary fact, not operative, toward estimating
the potential hazards to life and property. See, e.g., United States v. Northern
Pac. Ry., 254 U.S. 251, 254 (1920); Louisville & J. Bridge Co. v. United
States, 236 Fed. 1001, 1006 (W.D. Ky. 1916); United States v. Texas &
N.O.R.R., 13 F.2d 429, 431 (S.D. Tex. 1926) ; United States v. Northern Pac.
Ry., 54 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1931).
21 Compare United States v. South Buffalo R.R., 168 F.2d 948 (2d Cir.
1948), with United States v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 182 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1950).
22237 U.S. 402, 408 (1915).

23 United States v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., supra note 21, at 4.
24 See note 20, supra.
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the purpose of servicing two industries, 25 and where thirty-nine cars
were run four miles within a yard over secondary tracks without stopping, in order to reach an inspection area. 26 Additional single-yard
examples include the taking of twenty-three cars at a maximum of ten
miles per hour over a two-mile lead track which was intersected by an
extremely busy highway and a less vital road, and running thirtythree cars within the sight of the yard master a distance of one and
one-half miles over a secondary track unused by road trains and
under the control of yard crews, both times passing through a guarded
crossing.27
"Train movement" was judicially determined in United States
v. Boston & M.R.R. 28 as an "aggregation of cars drawn by the same
engine, and, if the engine is changed, . . . there is a different train."
United States v. Grand Trunk Ry. of Canada29 saw "cars coupled
together and locomotives drawing them," as the essence, while the
case of United States v. South Buffala R.R. 30 characterized the "train
movement" as the transfer of cars from one switching point to
another. In evaluating the essentials of "trains," movements by the
carrier for a commercial purpose are important, while the fact that the
cars are empty is not; 31 movements within an area designated by the
company as one yard are not automatically beyond the designation
"train"; 32 performance of switching actions before the completion of
an overall "train" movement will not effect the removal of that movement from within the brake provisions of the acts; 33 classification
of movements as "switching" for reasons of accounting, even if done
with the consent of the ICC, does not preclude actual treatment as
"trains." 34 To exemplify a combination of factors: forty-three, thirtyone, and forty-nine car movements of two to four miles, partially
on main lines intersected by roads and other railroads, accomplished
by yard crews and engines, were deemed "trains," although speeds
reached only six to nine miles per hour and the ultimate purpose

25 United States v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., .mpra note 21.
26

United States v. New York Cent. & H.R.R., 205 Fed. 428 (W.D.N.Y.

1913).

United States v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 199 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1952).
168 Fed. 148, 153 (D. Mass. 1909).
29 203 Fed. 775, 776 (W.D.N.Y. 1913).
30 168 F.2d 948, 951 (2d Cir. 1948).
31 See Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United States, 168 Fed. 236, 237 (8th Cir.
1909).
32 United States v. Panhandle & S.F. Ry., 203 F.2d 241, 245-46 (5th Cir.
1953); United States v. Southern Pac., 60 F.2d 864, 865 (9th Cir. 1932);
Illinois Cent. R-R. v. United States, 14 F.2d 747, 749 (8th Cir. 1926); Great
No. Ry. v. United States, 288 Fed. 190, 191 (8th Cir. 1923).
33 United States v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 13 F.2d 429, 431 (S.D. Tex. 1926)
(dictum).
34 United States v. South Buffalo R.R., 168 F,2d 948, 949, 951 (2d Cir.
1948).
27
28
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was to detach cars at intervals. 35 Another case 38 involved sixteen
cars being drawn one and one-quarter miles by a switch engine without halting, but crossing four streets and the tracks of two other
railroads. The facts were declared sufficiently similar to the case of
Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge v. United States3 7 to warrant a
like decision, viz., that a train movement had occurred. In United
States v. South Buffalo R.R.,3 8 the cause arose when cars bound
for distribution to industries were moved two miles at five miles
per hour within private property, and in so doing passed guarded
gates used heavily by the employees. In United States v. Thompson3 9
the facts were these: nineteen cars covered one and one-quarter
miles of main line in a three mile run, and the same crew and engine
returned over the same route with twenty-five cars, crossing two
private and barred roads in both processes.
For the sake of comparison the details of the instant case were
these: four groups of cars ranging from twenty-three to forty-nine
units moved a maximum distance of two miles without stopping in
order to deliver or recover cars from two industrial consignees. The
only operable air-brakes were those on the engine; further, several
road crossings were encountered as well as an inter-railroad transfer
track.40 The Supreme Court held a "train movement" had occurred.
The result of the foregoing leaves us basically with our original
query. 41 We have certain general tests, which the courts apply to
litigations having hundreds of variables. A clearly defined distinction has remained highly elusive. From the myriad of cases is to be
deduced neither concrete principle nor clear-cut policy. Indeed, case
constructions serve to compound the confusion, to create doubt and
uncertainty.
At best the instant case can be assayed as having limited value:
limited, because it leaves the crux of the problem, ie., non-definition,
intact; yet of some value because it provides another interpretive
example for use in future judicial actions faced with the issue whether
a train movement or a switching action is at hand.
It is submitted that the problem has been too long unanswered,
and that this case does little towards resolving it. Left to the courts
for over sixty-five years, the results have been unfortunate and un3
5 United States v. Galveston, H. & H.R.R., 255 Fed. 755 (5th Cir. 1919).
The opinion reasoned that any movement, even two to four miles, of freight
its ultimate destination signified a train. Id. at 758.
towards
3
6 Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. v. United States, 36 F.2d 670 (8th Cir.
1929).
37 249 U.S. 534 (1919).
38 168 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1948) (held a train movement).
39 252 F.2d 6 (8th Cir. 1958) (held a train movement).
40 United States v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 361 U.S. 78 (1959).
41 Indeed, some jurists feel that perhaps there is no exact rule for differentiating between a train movement and a switching action. See Chicago &
E.R.R. v. United States, 22 F.2d 729, 730 (7th Cir. 1927).
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successful. The need lies in the lack of clarity surrounding the conditions suggested by the letter and spirit of the air-brake provisions.
This corrected, the medial difficulties of judicial construction would
be eliminated.' But the solution can only be supplied by the Congress
or the ICC.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREE SPEECH-ORDINANCE PROHIBITING DISTRIBUTION OF ANONYMOUS

HANDBILLS HELD UNCONSTI-

TUTIONAL.-Defendant was convicted of violating a Los Angeles

ordinance prohibiting distribution of anonymous handbills.'
On
certiorari the Supreme Court held that the ordinance was an unconstitutional restraint on free speech.

Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60,

(1960).
By virtue of the first and fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution all persons are guaranteed the freedoms of speech
and of the press.2 It is also well settled that municipal ordinances
adopted under state authority constitute state action and are also
restricted.8 While the prohibitions of the Constitution are primarily
designed to prevent previous restraints on publication, 4 official reprisal against a person for having exercised the protected rights is
also forbidden.5 Nor is freedom of expression limited to the right
of publication; the Constitution is also violated by restrictions placed
upon circulation. 6
I Los ANGELES, CAL, MUNICIPAL CODE § 28.06: "No person shall distribute
any hand-bill in any place under any circumstances, which does not have
printed on the cover, or the face thereof, the name and address of the
following:
"(a) The person who printed, wrote, compiled or manufactured the same.
"(b) The person who caused the same to be distributed; provided, however, that in the case of a fictitious person or club, in addition to such fictitious
name, the true names and addresses of the owners, managers or agents of the
person sponsoring said hand-bill shall also appear thereon." Cited in Talley
v. California, 362 U.S. 60-61 (1960).
2 The first amendment expressly restricts the federal government, and the
fourteenth amendment has been held to restrict the states from unreasonable
infringement of these rights. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707
(1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
3 Cuyahoga River Power Co. v. City of Akron, 240 U.S. 462 (1916).
4Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
5 "[T]he mere exemption from previous restraints cannot be all that is
secured by the constitutional provisions, inasmuch as of words to be uttered
orally there can be no previous censorship, and the liberty of the press might
be rendered a mockery and a delusion, and the phrase itself a byword, if,
while every man was at liberty to publish what he pleased, the public authorities might nevertheless punish him for harmless publications." 2 COOLEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 885 (8th ed. 1927).
6 See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).

